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ABSTRACT
The increased amount of attacks targeting humans accessing and using computers has
made it significantly important to understand human and organizational behavior in attacks and
how resilient behavior can be achieved. This paper presents a research model that attempts to
understand how organizational and human factors complement each other in shaping information
security behavior. The model was developed through an inductive approach, in which content
domain experts were interviewed to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena. Common
patterns that were identified in the interviews were then combined with data collected through
surveying the literature. Specifically, the research model includes constructs related to the
organization and promotion of information security, constructs related to perceptions of
information security awareness and the social conditions within an organizational setting, and
individual constructs related to an individual’s perceptions of attitude, normative beliefs, and
self-efficacy. Implications for continuing research and how the model will be tested empirically
are discussed.
Keywords: Organization of information security; information security risks; organizational
structures; information security awareness
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INTRODUCTION
The increased effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it
more difficult to successfully attack computer systems using purely technical means. Many
attackers have therefore started to attack the humans accessing and using the computer systems
(Applegate 2009) . This development has increased the attention given to risks related to human
or social aspects of information security. In organizational settings, typical risks against
employees include the risk of being deceived to comply with a malicious request, e.g. execute
malware on the computer or reveal sensitive information (Mitnick and Simon 2002). Numerous
papers have therefore focused on describing important concepts and solutions to cope with these
risks. The research domain is however still rather immature, and the extant socio-technical
information security approaches have been criticized as lacking not only theoretically grounded
methods, but also empirical evidence on their effectiveness (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010):
only one paper examines organizational measures that are theory-based and evaluate their
effectiveness empirically trough actual socio-technical attacks (Workman 2008). Related
research has usually focused on investigating individual perceptions of external cues and
properties that determine policy compliance and based their analyses on a variety of theories
including theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu et al. 2010), general deterrence theory (Lee et al.
2004), and learning theory (Warkentin et al. 2011). Other related research have largely focused
on success rates of certain types of socio-technical attacks, e.g. (Dodgejr et al. 2007), or
analyzing characteristics that explain an individual’s susceptibility to these attacks, e.g.
(Pattinson et al. 2012). However, the effect of key organizational constructs proposed in
organizational and individual behavior literature, on information security has not been rigorously
examined (Hu et al. 2012). We therefore argue that there is a need for more studies linking key
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organizational and individual constructs to develop a better understanding of theoretical
relationship between constructs on different levels in an organization. We further believe that it
is important to investigate factors related to actual behavior while being under an attack, in
addition to studies on how compliant employees are to specific policies, or estimating success
probabilities for an attack. The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, we are interested in
getting a deeper understanding of how factors complement each other in shaping information
security behavior. Secondly, we suggest a research model that includes both organizational and
individual constructs to investigate how organizations can shape this behavior. We attempt to
fulfill this purpose through a combined method approach of conducting semi-structured
interviews with content experts and surveying the literature. The result is the main contribution
of the paper and is presented as a preliminary research model which includes a set of
organizational and individual constructs that potentially could shape information security
behavior.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents an overview of risks
related to insecure behavior and influences on information security behavior. The section that
follows presents the methodology for conducting the interviews. The findings from the combined
method approach is then presented and discussed. The paper concludes with a summarization of
this study’s findings together with both the preliminary research model and a description of
implications for the continuing research
SHAPING INFORMATION SECURITY BEHAVIOR
The purpose of the study is to identify important constructs for developing a research
model to investigate organizational and individual constructs, and their effectiveness in shaping
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security behavior. However, to understand why it’s important to shape information security
behavior, the risks related to insecure behavior are first described.
Risks Related to Insecure Behavior
In this study, the focus is on risks that could be realized through an attack exploiting
insecure behavior of an employee. Behavior that could be exploited include careless use of
email, computer passwords, use and disposal of computers, portable storage drives and other
hardware that can either contain sensitive information or spread malware, lack of precaution
when visiting suspicious websites or installing software, or falling victim to manipulative
techniques and comply to a malicious request. In this study we have examined insecure behavior
related to four attacks. These attacks are now further described.
Phishing is an attack described as the marriage between technology and social
engineering in which attackers use spoofed email messages to trick end-users into taking a
suggested action that benefits the attacker (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). For instance, the
attacker can convince end-users to reply with sensitive information such as user credentials or
click on a malicious link where the attacker either: i) automatically introduce malware by
exploiting vulnerabilities in the web browser (e.g. drive by download) or ii) persuade end-users
to execute malware on their computers. Malware can also be executed through hidden scripts in
attached documents.
In a Physical intrusion an attacker enters a target organization and try to obtain
information by impersonate a legitimate party such as an employee, visitor, or service personnel
using false credentials or a good story. Thus easily bypass any technical or physical defenses
(Mitnick and Simon 2002). Once inside the target organization, the attacker can look for
sensitive or even classified information by going through the trashes (so called dumpster diving),
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the office landscape (so called desktop hacking), or look over an employee’s shoulder to acquire
passwords or pin numbers (so called shoulder surfing).
An attacker can also use the phone to impersonate someone in a position of authority and
target someone less educated in the area of security (e.g. help desk employees) to increase the
information competence in the preparation for another, more valuable attack. When possible, the
attacker can also use this attack method to persuade the victim to reveal sensitive information
over the phone. We refer this type of attack as Phone fraud (Mitnick and Simon 2002).
Malware trough portable media is a practice of using a combination of technical and
social attack methods. For instance, an attacker can leave a USB memory stick, or a CD with a
tempting text, outside a building, to entice a victim’s curiosity into using the item in their
computer (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008).
Influences on Information Security Behavior
To gain a general understating of the potential influences on information security
behavior, related literature was first consolidated. This process resulted in an the understanding
that a behavior can be affected by an individual’s attitude towards information security,
normative beliefs about information security, and perceived knowledge of the topic, i.e. selfefficacy (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). These factors can further be influenced by the shared beliefs, and
relationships between employees (Hu et al. 2012), and perceptions of the organizational
information security policies, practices, and procedures (Chan et al. 2005). These social structure
perceptions can potentially be influenced by management actions that promote good information
security practices through clear direction, and provide knowledge of what is necessary for
managing information security risks (R. von Solms and B. von Solms 2006). These actions can
be deployed trough security structures, processes and transferring mechanisms. Organizational
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structures involve the existence of responsible functions such as senior-level information security
executives and a diversity of coordinating committees (Kayworth and Whitten 2010). The
structure of clear and unambiguous definitions of the roles and responsibilities of the involved
parties throughout the whole organization are prerequisites for effective information security.
Security processes refer to the strategic- and operational decision-making and monitoring of
security performance. However, even if processes and the above mentioned structures are in
place, it is possible that the information security efforts are not aligned with the business
strategy, environment and needs, and thus are ineffective. It is therefore crucial that also
knowledge transferring mechanisms are deployed in an organization.
The theoretical linkages provide a base for exploring the impact of various sociotechnical factors required to shape employee information security behavior. As this specific
linkage has not been rigorously examined, a deeper understanding of the domain is first required.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In developing a research model, MacKenzie et al. (2011) suggested that after gaining a
general understating of the domain, interviews using an inductive approach with content experts
should be conducted. Through the interview process, common patterns emerge and the
researcher then begins to search for literature which is treated as additional data, and compare
this data with the emerged patterns from the interviews (Trochim and Donnelly 2006). Six semi
structured interviews were utilized in order to capture rich, detailed information on content
experts’ views of the investigated domain in general, and factors to shape an employee’s
behavior when dealing with actual socio-technical attacks in particular. The number of
respondents was decided due to the following reasons: i) the study is of exploratory nature, and
ii) the last interview did not produce any new radical insights into the content experts’ view of
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the domain. The latter argument is given support by the literature recommending that interview
data should be collected until theoretical saturation take place and a too high number of
respondents will make thorough interpretations of the interviews difficult (Kvale 1986).
Data Collection
The interviews were carried out from February 2012 to June 2012. All respondents had
acquired a deep domain specific knowledge trough experience of the topic on a regular basis.
Two of the respondents were academics, but both have many years of practical experience in the
domain. The four practitioners were selected on recommendations, and have worked extensively
within the investigated domain. The data of respondents is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Respondent data
Respondent Position
1
2
3
4
5
6

Professor and scientist (private industry)
Senior Consultant
Consultant
Head of Security (private industry)
Associate professor and practitioner
Senior security researcher (private industry)

Experience
(Years)
>15
16
5
12
>10
>15

Time
(Hours)
1
1.5
1.5
2.5
2
1

Three of the interviews were carried out face-to-face at the expert’s respective places of
business, and three were carried out over telephone due to geographical concerns. The interviews
were audio-recorded and transcribed. Handwritten notes were also taken the interviewer and
transcribed electronically. The interviews all had the same general approach, and consisted of
two main objectives: (i) to gain a deeper understanding of important concepts for shaping
information security behavior and (ii) to discuss potential relationships between constructs
towards developing the model to investigate antecedents of information security behavior. In
terms of important constructs, we explicitly asked for opinions on constructs related to actual
behavior while being under a socio-technical attack, i.e., if these affect the outcome of attacks.
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Due to the complexity of acquiring data on how organizational and individual variables
complement each other in shaping information security behavior effort was spent to enforce
reliability of results. That is, the original layout and scope of the interviews was somewhat
changed according to the focus area(s) of the respondents. For example, no answers were forced,
and the respondents were allowed to discuss a particular area in greater detail. As a consequence,
more time was spent on those matters the respondents perceived to be of greater importance for
the topic of the study. The first part of the interview described the topic of the study and the
outline of the event. The second part concerned risks that could exploit insecure behavior. The
third part concerned potential constructs on both an organizational and individual level that
influence information security behavior. The final part concerned potential relationship between
organizational and individual constructs in order to shape information security behavior.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSSION
This section reports of the combined method approach using data from interviews and
from the literature. The constructs were classified as follows. Constructs categorized as
organizational constructs (See Table 2) are related to the organization and promotion of
information security. Individual constructs (See Table 3) are related either to perceptions of
information security awareness and the social conditions within an organizational setting (also
referred to as mediators in Table 1 and Figure 1, for example) as perceived by end-users or to an
individual’s attributes that influence information security behavior (also referred to as
motivational constructs in Figure 1 for example and comprising attitude, normative beliefs, and
self-efficacy).

Proceedings of the Seventh Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Orlando, December 15, 2012.

8

Rocha Flores and Ekstedt

A model for Investigating Organizational Impact on Information Security Behavior

Five broad organizational constructs were emerged from the analysis of the combined
data and presented in the Table 2 and illustrated in the research model (See Figure 1). In the
following, the constructs are discussed and the sources are specified.
Table 2. Organizational constructs
Construct
Key Aspects
Information Security Leadership Security Visions, Provide Role Model, Foster
Cooperation Towards Common goals, Set High
Performance Expectations
Organizational Structures
Formal Security Unit, CISO, Steering Committee, Welldefined Information Security Responsibilities
Information Security Processes
Information Security Planning, Performance Monitoring
Security Knowledge Transfer
Training on Policies, Threat Awareness, Informal
training, IT-based training
Shared Organizational Security
Security Awareness of Business Managers, Business
Knowledge
Awareness of Security Personnel
The importance of leadership was acknowledged early in the interviews. Respondent 1
argued as follows.
“All kinds of measures can be implemented and employees can be trained, but without
strong leadership to educate business unit managers and security personnel, measures will
not be effective. Strong leadership gives effective operational measures.”
Trough leadership, the importance of protecting information assets should be articulated,
and the leader should provide a role model for employees to follow, foster cooperation towards
common goals, and set performance expectations (Podsakoff et al. 1990).
The respondents agreed that structures are needed to facilitate the deployment of security
efforts, and communication between leaders, security personnel, and business representatives.
The literature also acknowledge the importance of structures for deploying management actions
and leadership (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008). Key aspects of the organizational
structures identified in this study are: formal security unit, an executive with information security
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as the main responsibility, the establishment of a committee comprised of business and security
personnel, and well-defined responsibilities (Kayworth and Whitten 2010).
Formal processes to develop policies, plan the implementation of security controls (e.g.
end-user training) and monitor the effectiveness of implemented controls were acknowledge as
crucial. Ongoing knowledge sharing is crucial to establish understanding and alignment between
business and IT managers (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008). By using mechanisms such as
security education and cross-training, shared security knowledge can be achieved among
managers and employees can understand what is expected of them, and how to protect
themselves from security risks. Respondent 2 and Respondent 3 shared the following.
“The operational personnel need to know what is expected of them. The persons at the
highest level of the organization need to communicate directives to operational personnel
so that they know why security measures are important, how to implement them, and why.”
“Business managers need to understand the importance of information security and
understand how it can be used to support the business and not hinder it. On the other hand
security mangers also need to understand the business and the end-user for developing
security policies and programs that focuses on the end-users perspective.”
Capturing and transferring the security knowledge to increase end-user awareness and
shape their behavior is usually conducted through formal awareness education and training
programs, workshops, lectures or through IT-based training tools. However, both the experts and
the literature argue that it is not enough to merely have formal knowledge transferring processes
in place – the management needs to assure and monitor that the users have comprehended the
knowledge for it to be truly effective (Barrett 2003). This could be done through implementing
regular security exercises using weaker forms of penetration tests. These exercises reinforce the
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training and education programs. It also keeps the users alert, and more prepared in the occasion
of an actual socio-technical attack (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008).
Three broad constructs, working as mediators for an individual’s motivation towards
behaving secure (i.e. attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy), were emerged from the
analysis of the combined data. These are presented in the Table 3 and illustrated in the research
model (See Figure 1).
Table 3. Mediators
Constructs
Perceived Awareness

Key Aspects
Public information policy
Internet use policy
Installation policy
Written information policy
Hardware disposal policy
Communication policy
Call-back policy
Perceived Social Culture
Shared Beliefs, Shared Goals, Social Relationships
Perceived Learning Environment Perceived Support, Verbal Feedback, Vicarious experience
Policies are used as formal directives, and are crucial to manage socio-technical risks by
shaping employee behavior that is conducive to the protection of information assets (Da Veiga
and Eloff 2010). How effective the policy is, depends on how well the employees accept the
policy, i.e. how well the policy fit to the culture of the organization. Respondent 4 shared the
following.
“There are individuals in an organization that behave insecurely regardless of formal
organizational directives. It is difficult to shape individual behavior, it is therefore
important to shape an organization, and by doing so employees will be influenced by each
other. For instance, by looking at how colleagues behave the behavior of a single
employee can potentially be influenced”.
Respondent 5 shared the following.
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“You can implement a thousand polices, but they will not be accepted if they don’t fit to the
cultural environment within the organization. Some policies might be more accepted by
employees working in military and civilian government facilities, and international
airports, while employees at a local construction company might strongly reject the same
policy if they find it irrelevant with regards to the type of environment they work in.”
Punishment is thought to not be effective. Respondent 4 and respondent 5 shared the following.
“I don’t believe punishment is effective. You should talk with your employees and teach
them how to prevent incidents. There should be a supportive environment in the
organization, not a punishment oriented.”
“Using disciplinary measures only creates a negative feeling which can affect the
productivity and motivation of the employees. Employees complying with a request from a
malicious perpetrator in good faith shouldn’t be punished.”
The comments indicate that efforts should be directed to encourage employees towards
security-savvy behavior. All six respondents contributed to the identification of specific policies
to shape information security behavior. Polices recommended by the experts and the litterateur
are described as follows. Policies can regulate that only generic information should be listed on
publicly available sources, that employee Internet usage is restricted (e.g. usage of social
network sites during work hours), and that additional software installation privileges are
restricted (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010). Policies can also address the acceptable use and disposal of
sensitive information written on paper, and the acceptable use and disposal of hardware that can
contain sensitive information (Peltier 2006). Awareness of policies addressing information that
can be communicated, how it can be communicated, to whom and under what conditions is also
believed to influence information security behavior (Dontamsetti and Naranayan 2009). Finally,

Proceedings of the Seventh Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Orlando, December 15, 2012.

12

Rocha Flores and Ekstedt

A model for Investigating Organizational Impact on Information Security Behavior

employees should be informed that whenever any questionable request is made by phone, they
should call back and check that the number belongs to someone with suitable authorization
(Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). The importance of social structures, culture and an environment
that encourage learning was acknowledged by the respondents. Respondent 4 and respondent 5
discussed these aspects thoroughly, and from the literature key aspects related to social culture
(Chow and Chan 2008) and learning environment were identified (Warkentin et al. 2011).
SUMMARY AND CONLUSION
We attained a deeper understanding of how factors complement each other in shaping
information security behavior. Furthermore, a research model that includes both organizational
and individual constructs to shape this behavior is suggested (See Figure 1). To test the research
model, empirical data will be collected using the key informant methodology in which
respondents will be chosen based on their position, experience and professional knowledge. Data
will be collected from two key-informants per organization – one from the security organization
with a role such as: Chief Information Officer, IT Manager, Chief Information Security Officer,
and Security Officer, and one with a role that include regular utilization of information
technology products and services, e.g. computers, Internet access, electronic mail, etc. (at least
ten respondents per organization). Hypothesis related to the research model will be tested using
structural equation modeling. To assure the validation of the measurement instrument, the
conceptual domain of the included constructs will firstly be defined as recommended by
(MacKenzie et al. 2011). Then, items to capture the constructs will be generated, and the content
validity of the items will be assessed. After formally specifying a measurement model, empirical
data will be collected from convenience samples through two pilot surveys. To measure actual
behavior while being under a socio-technical attack, we are currently conducting several
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experiments. Quantitative data is being collected through several case studies using a scenariobased survey and unannounced phishing experiments. As a scenario-based survey is planned to
be used for measuring information security behavior in the empirical study, the usefulness of a
scenario-based survey to assess information security behavior will be evaluated by comparing
the results from both methodology approaches. Finally, the validated research model will be set
to the test through collection of data from Swedish organizations.

Organizational constructs
Information Security
Leadership

Mediatiors

Motivational constructs

Perceived Learning
Oriented Environment

Attitude

Organizational
Structure

Shared Organizational
Security Knowledge

Perceived Social
Information Security
Culture

Normative Beliefs

Information Security
Process

Security Knowledge
Transfer

Perceived Employee
Awareness

Self-Efficacy

Information security
behavior

Figure 1. Preliminary research model
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